Tuesday 31 March 2009

Earth Hour 2009


Earth Hour 2009

It was the night of 28th March, 2009 when the clock struck 20.30 Hrs (IST) symbolizing the time for the united effort in combating global resource and energy wastage.

2007:

Earth Hour was held on March 31 in Sydney, Australia at 7:30 pm, local time.

Measurement of reduction in electricity use

According to figures from EnergyAustralia, a local utility, mains electricity consumption for the 2007 event in Sydney was 2% lower during the Hour than would be expected given the time, weather conditions and past four years' consumption patterns. The Herald Sun equated this with "taking 48,613 cars off the road for 1 hour." Critics, most notably Columnist Andrew Bolt, labelled this as "A cut so tiny is trivial - equal to taking six cars off the road for a year". In context, the six cars equates to there being six fewer cars on the road at any given point of time in the day or night. In response to this criticism, the organisers of Earth Hour counter that "If the greenhouse reduction achieved in the Sydney CBD during Earth Hour was sustained for a year, it would be equivalent to taking 48,616 cars off the road for a year." and they also note that the main goal of Earth Hour is to create awareness around climate change issues and "to express that individual action on a mass scale can help change our planet for the better."and not about the specific energy reductions made during the hour being all that's required.


So what exactly is Earth Hour ?

Earth Hour, basically refers to those 60 minutes of a particular day of a year, when the people for the cause of saving Earth's resources and duelling with the precariously rising global warming scenario, unite together to switch off their lights, fans, computers (and similar electrical gadgets) voluntarily for the benefit of our future generations. Not only does this united effort help in saving huge amounts of energy, it also lowers the rate of burning of fuels for that hour, and hence leading to a slower rate of global warming formation for that period.

Earth Hour is a global event organized by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and is held on the last Saturday of March annually, asking households and businesses to turn off their non-essential light and other electrical appliances for one hour to raise awareness towards the need to take action on climate change. Earth hour was conceived by WWF and the in 2007, when 2.2 million residents of Sydney participated by turning off all non-essential lights


This year, India (Cities: Mumbai and New Delhi) hosted Earth Hour 2009 at 20.30 hrs on the 28th March, 2009. Candles were lit at various places and glittering places were switched off to complete darkness. This year witnessed on the global scale a huge response from the common people as well as from leading personalities across the world. Delhi's power demand fell by 1000MW. The “phenomenal” dip is attributed to the Earth Hour observed by Delhi on 28.03.09.


Manipal Earth Hour 2009:

Coming to our celebrations of Earth Hour in Manipal, very few students though participated. 8th block was one of the only blocks in MIT, to have observed Earth Hour. We had informed as many students as possible to participate in this cause. As the clock struck 20.30, the whole of 3rd Floor plunged into darkness. Cheers rang out loud, and candles were burnt in my room, to symbolize this moment of unity in our endeavour to save planet Earth. The weather was quite hot, and hence it soon became very sweaty. Inspite of this, we did not back down and completed the Earth Hour successfully. Lights, fans, mobile chargers, laptop chargers and table lamps were shut off for this cause.


It was in all a very good experience that made us feel that we too can individually create a difference for our Mother Earth inspite of being just 1 among the 6.77 billion people of this planet !


Tuesday 24 March 2009

Don't mess with Engineers !

7 Engineers and 7 Doctors are going from PUNE to Mumbai.So both groups gather at Pune Station.

Both groups are desperately trying to prove their superiority .

SCENE 1 (PUNE- MUMBAI):
-------------------------------------- -------------
7 engineers take only 1 Ticket and 7 doctors buy all 7 tickets..
Doctors are desperately waiting for TC to come......
When TC arrives,
All 7 Engineers get in one toilet so when TC knocks, one hand come out with the ticket and the TC goes

Away....

NOW on return Journey All of them don't get a direct Train to PUNE. So they all decide to take a Passenger till Lonavala, from there they can easily get a LOCAL to PUNE



SCENE 2 (MUMBAI - LONAVALA):
---------------------------------- ------------------------------
Doctors decided, "this time we will prove that we too are equal"....All 7 Doctors take 1 Ticket Engineers don't buy any ticket at all!!!!!..

TC arrives....

ALL DOCTORS IN ONE TOILET.ALL ENGINEERS IN THE OPPOSITE.

One engineer gets out and knocks the door of Doctors toilet, One hand comes with the tickets, he takes the
ticket and comes in E ngg. Bathroom !... TC DRIVES out ALL the doctors from the toilet and they are heavily fined.


SCENE 3 ( LONAVALA): !
-----------------------------------------
SO now both the groups r on LONAVALA station. Doctors planning their move for last chance, they board the local to Pune.

This time doctors decide that they will play the same (1 ticket) trick.

ALL Doctors take 1 tickets...Engineers BUY all 7 tickets this time...
SO TC Comes.. All Engineers showed their tickets ................... ....

Doctors are still searching for toilet in the LOCAL train............



Conclusion: Technically intelligent people are geniuses, don't mess with Engineers.

Friday 20 March 2009

Ajmal - The Truth ( Final - Part V )







PART V


The Mumbai police control room becomes a war zone

March 20, 2009


26/11 Mumbai Attacked, one of the first books on last winter's murderous acts of terror, explains the reality behind the attacks. It reiterates the chilling reality that India is under grave threat and the clock is ticking before the next big attack.

In the concluding part of a five-part series, we bring to you an exclusive excerpt written by journalist Ashish Khetan on how the Mumbai police broke Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist in the attacks, immediately after his arrest and got vital information.
________________________________________

The Confession
The crime branch of the Mumbai police -- a specialised department in neutralising and investigating organised crime as well as intricate cases that are beyond the competence of local police stations -- has a staff of 150 experienced detectives. The entire bureau is headed by a joint commissioner of police. Since June 2007 the joint commissioner of the crime branch was Rakesh Maria.

A tall and broad-shouldered man, every strand of greying hair in place, Maria was known to be a workaholic. But on November 26 he left for the day at 8.50 pm, two hours before his usual time. Maria wanted to spend some time with his twenty-one-year-old son who was leaving that night for Ahmednagar to participate in an inter-university championship.

At 9.40 pm Maria's son left home. Ten minutes later, as he was getting ready to retire to bed, he received a call from the police control room: armed gunmen had opened indiscriminate fire at the CST station killing dozens of commuters. By the time he got into his car, reports of firing at Leopold Caf'e, at the Taj Mahal hotel and at the Trident-Oberoi hotels had also poured in.

As he asked his driver to head towards Mumbai police headquarters, the commissioner of police, Hasan Gafoor called and instructed Maria to take charge of the police control room. At 10.22 pm Maria reached the control room. By the time he walked in there, the command centre of Mumbai police had turned into a war zone.

Dozens of telephone lines and wireless communication channels were buzzing like bees. Beads of sweat were falling off the foreheads of police personnel fielding calls from the public, coordinating among the 45,000 city police personnel and communicating with eighty-six police stations and senior officers spread across Mumbai. A few gunmen had simultaneously attacked different sites throughout the city.

Dozens had already died while hundreds of injured needed immediate medical aid. It seemed the city was at war. A giant screen was showing the important city landmarks and locations of over 3,000 police vans patrolling in different areas. Maria started mobilising the police personnel, dispatching police vans to the troubled spots. Around 10.35 pm, reports came that a bomb had gone off in a speeding taxi on the Western Express Highway, close to the Santacruz airport.

So powerful was the explosion that the head of the taxi driver got severed from the torso and after shooting thirty feet up in the air, got stuck in the branches of a tree. Five minutes later at 10.40 pm another call came that a second bomb had exploded, again in a taxi, this time in Wadi Bunder, approximately 25 km from the location of the first blast.

Memories of the 1993 serial blasts were refreshed in Maria's mind. How many more bombs were waiting to go off? Two suspicious looking bags outside the Taj and one bag outside the Trident hotel had already been sighted. Maria instructed all police stations to comb their areas. Bomb disposal squads were dispatched to different sites.

Then reports of police casualties started trickling in. At around 11.25 pm Maria got the call that Additional Commissioner Sadanand Date, who had followed the terrorists into Cama Hospital, was injured, while a constable accompanying him had been killed. Between 10.29 pm and 12.11 am Maria diverted over 200 police personnel towards Cama Hospital.

During that time (Hemant) Karkare, (Ashok) Kamte, (Vijay) Salaskar and others had headed towards the hospital. Not far from there, at the CST station, were three SRPF striking forces, one RCP (Riot Control Police) striking force of around twenty personnel, eight mobile vans, one QRT and one SOS team. In addition, four DCPs and four senior police inspectors were also in the area. But unfortunately, the reinforcements never moved inside the lane where Karkare and the others were waiting.

At 12.25 am, Maria received a wireless message from Arun Jadhav, Salaskar's bodyguard. He said terrorists had hijacked the police vehicle in which he and Karkare and the others were travelling, that they had 'injured' everybody and finally abandoned the vehicle outside Vidhan Bhavan with him inside it.

Jadhav told Maria that the terrorists had then hijacked a black Honda City. Yet somehow, in that three-minute communication, Jadhav stricken with panic failed to tell Maria that the terrorists had killed Karkare and the others. It was only after Additional Commissioner Parambir Singh reached Vidhan Bhavan that Maria was informed about the outcome of the episode.

A little later a senior police inspector of DB Marg police station informed the control room that they had killed one and caught another terrorist alive.

Throughout the night Maria coordinated with the MARCOS, then the NSG, placing dozens of calls to the Maharashtra chief secretary, the Western Navy Command, the Union home ministry, and the Army headquarters in Delhi, besides numerous other offices and bureaucrats.

At around 1.30 am Maria was told to interrogate Ajmal Kasab who was at the Nair Hospital. After Ghadge's interrogation was over, Maria had already been updated by the DB Marg police about the revelations made by Kasab.

Maria sent one of his trusted detection officers Prashant Marde to Nair Hospital with the brief to just clarify four points: 1) How had they come; 2) How many of them had entered the city; 3) What weapons did they have with them; and 4) What task had each terrorist been assigned? At around 4.30 am, as Maria was busy arranging transport to pick up the NSG commandos from the airport, Marde called and briefed him on the four crucial points.

Based on the details provided by DB Marg police and Marde, Maria briefed the NSG in his office at around 5.30-6 am.



Accounting for the bombs the terrorists carried

March 20, 2009


At around 9.30 am a police motorcade carrying Kasab turned into the police headquarters. A posse of two dozen policemen armed with assault rifles escorted Kasab into the crime branch interrogation room. Maria was waiting for him.

Though he had been told Kasab was not more than twenty-one years old, he expected a tougher guy, at least in looks. Maria had imagined a withered and rugged appearance. Not a baby-faced, smooth-skinned, blushing jihadi. Kasab, the fidayeen, looked like a kid. With the beck of his finger Maria signalled Kasab to sit on the ground. Leaning forward, his six-feet-one-inch frame towering over Kasab, Maria said, 'There is no point in hiding things. We know how to wrench the truth out of you. And you don't think I or anybody here gives a damn about your injuries. So you better start singing now.'

'Sahab, I have already told you that I am a Pakistani and I joined the LeT one and a half years back. As far as other things are concerned I have explained everything to your guys,' said Kasab, sighing and groaning, exhibiting fatigue and pain.

'I don't care for your pain. You look in my eyes and tell me how many of you have landed in Mumbai,' growled Maria.

'We were just ten of us. We came by sea and then split into five teams. Ismail and I were part of one team. The other four teams went to the Taj, the Oberoi and the Chabad House. Abu Rehman Bada, Abu Ali, Abu Soheb and Abu Umer had been assigned the job of the Taj. Abu Rehman Chhota and Abu Fahad were given the task of storming the Oberoi. And Abu Aakasha and Abu Umar had gone to the Chabad House,' Kasab confirmed. He also gave the physical characteristics of each terrorist and a description of their clothes.

'Where are your local logistics providers? Did you get in touch with anyone after reaching Mumbai?' Maria just could not believe that the ten had pulled off an attack of this magnitude without local support.

'No. We did not know anyone in Mumbai. We had no names or numbers. We were just told about our targets. Once we landed, we took taxis and went straight to our targets.'

'What time did you land?'

'Can't tell exactly. But it was somewhere around 8.15-8.30 pm.'

'Then why did the attack at the CST begin at 9.40 pm, an hour after you landed?'

'After landing we had a chat among ourselves. We decided that since we all had to reach different locations and we might get traffic on our way, we would begin the attack only after 9.40 pm. We were sure that all of us would reach our respective targets within an hour and so that was the time decided to begin the attack. Ismail and I had to wait for ten to fifteen minutes before we got a taxi. Ismail and I were the first ones to catch ones, the others were still waiting for the cabs when we left. We got off at the station after which I went to a toilet there while Ismail waited outside. I wanted to pee real bad. Then I came out and waited another few minutes. After my watch showed 9.40 pm we removed our guns from the bags and opened fire.'

'What were the arms and ammunition you all were carrying?'

'We had one AK-47, one pistol, two magazines for the pistol, six to eight magazines of AK-47 and ten to twelve hand grenades on each of us. Besides, we had a lot of loose cartridges of AK which we did not count,' said Kasab. He had earlier told Ghadge that each had eight hand grenades and had made no mention of the loose cartridges. To Maria, however, he gave a higher figure for the ammunition.

Twice Maria posed the question differently but Kasab gave the same figure: one AK-47, one pistol, ten to twelve hand grenades, and six to eight magazines.

'Don't you think you are forgetting something here?' Maria narrowed his eyes, moving his face closer to Kasab's.

For a few moments Kasab just stared listlessly into Maria's eyes, his face so close to Maria's that he could not look elsewhere. And then he said, 'Sorry, I forgot to mention it. We brought bombs as well. Each of us had one bomb, which we carried in a separate bag. We wanted to plant these bombs on the periphery of our targets so that when the police arrive they would get killed by the explosion.'

Maria finally had a figure on the total number of bombs that had entered the city the previous night. His mind started calculating.

Seven bombs had already exploded -- one each in two taxis, one on the sixth floor at the Taj, one outside the Trident hotel, one inside the Oberoi, one at a petrol pump near Chabad House and one on the staircase of Chabad House. Two had been defused -- one on the promenade facing the Gateway and one in a bylane on the back side of the Taj. But there was still one bomb left. Where was the tenth bomb? Maria's head started reeling.

'Where is the bomb that you were carrying?'

'I had put it in the cab we took for VT station, under the seat of the driver. Ismail sat next to the driver while I sat at the back. On our way I connected the wires, set the timer and pushed it under the seat.'

The riddle of two bomb explosions -- one at Vile Parle and the other at Wadi Bunder -- on 26 November was slowly unravelling. Laxminarayan Goyal from Hyderabad who had come to Mumbai on business took the same taxi from CST. At around 10.35 pm, when his taxi reached Vile Parle, the bomb placed by Kasab went off, killing both Goyal and the taxi driver. When the police reached the spot they found just a few rods of the engine section left of the taxi. The taxi driver had just jumped a traffic signal. Had he, like other vehicles, waited for the signal to turn green, the death toll would have been much higher. Around the same time another bomb placed in another taxi had blasted at Nal Bazar in Wadi Bunder, killing a woman passenger and the taxi driver.

'If you wanted to kill policemen why did you place the bomb in the taxi?'

'We thought that taxis would only move around in South Mumbai and their explosions would kill the approaching policemen.'

'Where did Ismail leave his bomb?' Maria asked, as that was the only one unaccounted for.

'He left it at VT station. I don't know where exactly he left the bag but it was somewhere at the station.'

But the bomb had not exploded. It was finally recovered six days later, on the evening of 3 December, when railway personnel were sorting out the 150-odd bags left behind by the dead, the injured and other passengers who had been caught in Ismail's and Kasab's line of fire. All the bags had been dumped by the railway police in a parcel room on the first floor of the CST. After Kasab's revelation the Mumbai police tried to locate the black and white bag as described by him but they could not find it. Luckily, the timer of the bomb had malfunctioned and it had not caused further damage.




Kasab's second grilling in the early hours of November 27

March 20, 2009


How did you reach Mumbai? I want to know each and everything that happened on the high seas. Take me through your entire sea journey. Don't cut the long story short.'

'All ten of us had been kept in isolation for the last three months in an LeT safe house in Azizabad, on the outskirts of Karachi. On 22 November, we woke up at the break of dawn and were taken to a creek area in a jeep with tinted glasses. At around 8 am we all got on to a boat that was waiting for us at the shore. After about forty minutes of sailing we spotted a larger boat called Al-Husseini which I was told belonged to Lakhvi chacha. There were seven LeT mujahids who were already on board. We were told that the arms and ammunition were already there on Al-Husseini. All of us were then escorted into a cabin in the basement where we spent the next thirty hours. We were told to shave and be ready. On the 23rd at around 3 pm, we felt a thud as if something had come and struck against our boat. An Indian fishing trawler had docked next to our boat. One mujahid came running to the basement and told us to hurry up. It was time to leave.

'When we went up we saw four Indian fishermen being hauled from their trawler on to our boat. We hopped on to the Indian trawler. The sailor of the trawler was still on board. Our bags containing arms and ammunition and ration for the journey were also transferred into the Indian boat. A rubber speedboat and a foot pump were also hauled on the Indian boat. We all hugged the Al-Husseini crew members and started our journey towards Mumbai. Ismail was our group leader and he assigned us on board duties. Nine of us including Ismail performed watch duties in two-hour shifts. Only Imran Babar was exempted from watch duties as he had to cook. We kept a log book to make entries of our work shifts.

'Finally on 26 November at around 4 pm Ismail told us we were now very close to Mumbai. We waited till it turned dark. At around 7 pm we inflated the rubber boat with the foot pump and transferred our bags on to the boat. After sailing for over an hour we reached the fishermen colony at Badhwar Park at around 8.15-8.30 pm.'

'How did the LeT crew members manage to intercept the Indian fishing trawler, Kasab?' Maria probed.

'Sahab, I don't know exactly. But from the snatches of conversation I overheard while crossing over to the Indian boat it appeared that the Al-Husseini crew members waved a broken engine belt towards the Indian boat and asked for help. As the Indian trawler docked next to us, they kidnapped four Indian crew members and transferred them to Al-Husseini.'

'Who sailed the Indian trawler to Mumbai?'

'Amar Sinh Solanki, the Indian sailor, Ismail and Abu Umer. The three of them sailed and navigated the boat to Mumbai.'

'Where is Amar Sinh Solanki?'

'Ismail and Shoaib killed Solanki just before we boarded the rubber boat. Once we spotted Mumbai from the high seas we waited in the waters for some time. As it grew darker Ismail called up somebody higher up in the LeT and told him that we were only 4 nautical miles off from Mumbai. Speaking in coded language Ismail asked what we should do with the Indian sailor. The LeT boss on the other end said, "Humne to chaar bakre kha liye hain, tum bhi apna bakra kha lo." It was the coded message to kill the sailor, Amar Sinh Solanki. Ismail and Shoaib killed him by slitting his throat and dumped his body in the engine room.'

Maria immediately relayed the important information to the Indian Coast Guard and requested them to look for the Indian fishing trawler.

'Tell me how Ismail knew he was just 4 nautical miles off Mumbai. What navigation tools was he using?' Maria resumed the interrogation.

'We used a GPS to navigate. We were all trained to operate the GPS. But throughout the journey it was Ismail who operated it and he also spoke to the LeT bosses on his satellite phone.'

'Where are the GPS and the sat phone you used on the seas?' Maria enquired.

'I was the safe keeper of the sat phone and the GPS. But as we were lowering the dinghy into the waters another fishing boat came very close to us. We got scared and thought it might be the Indian Navy. Quickly, we loaded our bags on the boat and set off towards Mumbai. In the hurry I forgot Ismail's sat phone and GPS behind on the Indian trawler. Halfway into the journey Ismail suddenly remembered the sat phone and the GPS. We deliberated if we should go back to fetch it but then decided against it and kept sailing towards Mumbai.'

Halting the interrogation, Maria again left room to update the Coast Guard about the new information.

'Kasab. Tell me everything you know about the LeT,' said Maria on entering the room.

'Sahab, I don't know much. I joined it only a year and a half back. My father pushed me into this.'

'Look Kasab,' Maria interrupted Kasab before he could go into a spell of self-pity. 'We have had enough of your bleeding heart stories. You have been telling my officers that your father pushed you into this. That you were very poor. That you did not have enough to eat. That you did this just for money. You better stop bluffing now. Because we have arrested a few of your colleagues and they have told us everything, about you, the LeT, your training,' said Maria rubbing his forearms and then puffed his chest with a deep breath.

Two of Maria's detection officers pulled up stools lying in a corner and placing them close to Kasab, encircled him.

'I know everything. But I want to hear it from your mouth,' said Maria, his eyes glinting, a know-all smile playing on his lips. 'I don't like lies, Kasab.' Maria's face suddenly stiffened, the smile disappeared, and his broad jaw tightened up.

For a few seconds Kasab kept staring at Maria. Ghadge had never questioned Kasab's tearjerker narrative. But Maria would have none of it. And now he had some of his colleagues in custody too. Who could it be? Kasab wondered.


Kasab: 'We joined LeT so that we could get arms training for criminal activity'

March 20, 2009


After a brief silence, Kasab began: 'I studied up to fourth standard and then in the year 2000 I dropped out of school and went to Lahore. I stayed there with my brother Afzal who was staying at House No. 12, Galli No. 54, Mohalla Tohidabad, near Yadgar Minar. I did the job of a construction worker till 2005. In between I visited my village many times. Finally in 2005, I quit my job and went back to my village, thinking I would stay there.

'But my father scolded me and I left home and went to Ali Hajveri Darbar at Lahore. It was a kind of shelter home for young homeless boys and the management there used to assist us in finding employment. I found employment with a contractor called Shafiq who was in the catering business. For the next two years I worked with him at his shop called 'Welcome Tent Service'. But the money I earned was never enough. Around this time Shafiq, a friend of mine, and I carried out a few small robberies. We then decided to plan a robbery big enough to fetch us lakhs of rupees in one go, 'Kasab revealed.

The transformation in Kasab's persona was radical. A few hours back he had portrayed himself as a timid, obedient son waylaid by his greedy, selfish father. Now, with the threat of being exposed by fellow terrorists staring him in the face, Kasab unveiled his true side willingly. Yes. He was a labourer and his father was a poor vendor. But it was he who had taken to crime, prompted by his own needs, initiated into the world of violence not by his father but by a criminal friend. An indifferent father was just a ruse to earn sympathy from the police.

'We wanted to acquire weapons. But it was not easy,' Kasab continued. 'After much deliberation we thought we would join the LeT. We thought we would get both weapons and training to operate them. We filled up a few forms and joined the organisation. At Muridke we went through an induction period of twenty-one days. The trainers were very strict and everything from namaz to lunch to dinner happened with clockwork precision. But in the first three weeks we were not trained to operate firearms. I was not enjoying it much but Shafiq said that in the next phase we would be imparted the arms training. After the completion of the first phase, we were taken to a small village in Mansera where we were given initial training of handling AKs, Uzi guns and pistols. We were also given lectures on Islam and Hadith. We were told that our religion was in danger and Muslims were being killed everywhere. That was when I decided I would not go back to robbery but would continue with the LeT.

'I went home in between and returned to participate in a training camp at a hilly area called Chelabandi in PoK. Here we were trained to handle explosives, rocket launchers and mortars. At the end of the three months' training period thirty-two of us were selected by Zaki chacha for waging jihad. Sixteen were sent for some operation, the details of which I don't know. Out of the remaining sixteen, three escaped from the camp. We, the remaining thirteen, were then sent to a training camp at Muridke. Abu Kahfa was our leader. Here we were trained to operate GPS instruments and to navigate boats in the sea. We were conditioned to sail on the high seas for long. We were taught swimming as well. After the training was over I went home to see my mother. After a week I returned to the LeT camp at Muzaffarabad. The thirteen of us were again trained to sail on the seas and navigate boats.

'Zaki chacha then sent six from amongst us for some operation in Kashmir. Three other men then joined us. They had already been mujahids for some time and had done operations elsewhere. One among them was Ismail. He was made the leader of our group. In the second week of September we were shifted to an LeT safe house at Azizabad in Karachi. Here we were told to carry out the Mumbai operation. I was only informed about the VT station attack which was entrusted to me. The operation was initially planned for 27 September but then got delayed, the reasons for which I do not know. We then whiled away our time. We were given the best food and the best clothes. Zaki chacha said we could have anything in the world we wanted before setting out for Mumbai. Initially, we knew each other only by our code names. But soon we told each other our real names, though we were not supposed to. But we bonded well and shared many personal details.'

'So tell me all the real names and the addresses of your accomplices?'

'Ismail's full name is Ismail Khan. He is from Dera Ismail Khan in North West Frontier Province. Abu Ali's real name is Javed. He is around twenty-two years old and he and I come from the same district -- Okara. Abu Fahad's real name is Fahadullah and he too hails from my district. Abu Aakasha is Babar Imran and he is from Multan. I don't know the name of his village. Abu Soheb is Shoaib and he is the youngest among us. He is from village Shakkargarh Naroval in Sialkot. Abu Umar's true name is Nasir and he comes from Faisalabad. Abu Umer too is from Faisalabad. His real name is Nazeer. He is the oldest among us. Abu Rehman Bada is actually Hafiz Arshad and he is from Multan. Abu Rehman Chhota is also from Multan and his true name is Abdul Rehman.' Kasab finally gave away the real names of his group members.

Later, Maria shared these names with the RAW that, through its undercover agents in Pakistan, collected more information on them.

'Who else besides Zaki has trained you?'

'Abu Hamza, Abu Al Qama, Abu Kahfa and Yousuf alias Muzammil were the other trainers.'

'When you were sailing towards Mumbai who all did you speak to on the sat phone from the deck?'

'Ismail did most of the talking. He was speaking to many in the LeT including Muzammil.'

'Who did he make the last conversation with about the five bakras?'

'It was Muzammil.'

'Who provided you the maps of your targets?'

'I don't know. I was just shown a CD of the VT station. I assume others too were shown similar CDs of their respective targets. But we were never told about the LeT operatives active in Mumbai or at other places in India.'

In a few weeks, the crime branch investigation revealed that two LeT terrorists -- Faheem Ansari and Mohammad Sabahuddin -- who were arrested by the UP police earlier that year, on charges of abetting and aiding in another terror case, had provided the maps and the video footage of the CST, the Oberoi, the Taj and Nariman House to their LeT bosses in Pakistan. They were allegedly involved in the killing of seven paramilitary troops in an audacious attack at a CRPF camp in Rampur on 1 January 2008.



When Kasab saw the remains of other terrorists


March 20, 2009


Ansari, originally from Uttar Pradesh but born and brought up in Mumbai, had joined the LeT in 2003 while he was in Dubai. In 2007, he came to Mumbai and stayed there for about three months. Though his parents and brothers were staying in Goregaon he made no contact with them during his entire stay. Ansari later told Maria that he first stayed in a guest house at Grant Road but after a few weeks he had rented a small accommodation. He also told Maria that he wanted to take a place on rent in Colaba but then had to settle at Grant Road as Colaba was very expensive.

Ansari did a reconnaissance of several landmarks in Mumbai including the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Mumbai police headquarters at Crawford Market, the Maharashtra police headquarters in Colaba, the Mahalaxmi temple and the Sidhivinayak temple. He went to the Taj and the Oberoi hotels as a tourist and shot video footage of the interiors. He also captured the CST and the Chabad House on tape. Besides, he hand-drew the maps of all the 26/11 targets. In December 2007, he travelled to Kathmandu, where he met and handed over the material to Bihar-born Sabahuddin. Sabahuddin had also conspired in attacking the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, in December 2005. Ansari then travelled on a Pakistani passport to Karachi and gave the maps to Muzammil as well. Later, when Ansari and Sabahuddin were arrested by the UP ATS in February 2008, several hand-drawn maps of different roads and buildings and installations in Mumbai were recovered from them. But the video footage and maps of the 26/11 targets had already been handed over to the LeT top brass in Pakistan.

'Did you ever meet Hafiz Sayeed, the chief of LeT?'

'Yes. He came and gave sermons during one of our early training sessions. He told us that Muslims worldwide need to rise in jihad against the infidels.'

'What else did Sayeed say in his sermon?' asked Maria.

'He said that we had to fight the war for Allah. He said if we die waging jihad, our faces would glow like the moon. Our bodies would emanate scent. And we would go to paradise.'

'Did you ever have a one-on-one meeting with Sayeed?'

'No. Never. He was a very big man and I was just one of the recruits.'

Maria, of course, knew by now that Kasab was small fry, just a foot soldier, and this was as far as he could take him in the investigation. As Maria got up to leave the room Kasab said, 'Sahab. Will you tell me who have you arrested besides me?'

'You will come to know,' said Maria and left.

Keeping in mind Rakesh Maria's impeccable record in investigating terror-related cases, the Maharashtra government made him the chief investigator of the 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai. The 1993 serial bomb blasts and the 2003 Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazar blasts were the other terror cases that had been cracked by Maria. Over the next two months, in coordination with the RAW and IB, Maria analysed the satellite phone, the GPS instruments, the mobile phones, the AK-47 rifles, pistols, hand grenades, and the speedboat, among other things recovered from the scenes of crime.

The speedboat used by the terrorists to cover the last leg of their journey to Mumbai was brand new but was painted yellow to make it look old. The terrorists had also erased the engine number but with the help of forensic experts the police retrieved the original number -- 67 CL-1020015 -- which was manufactured by Yamaha Motor Corporation, Japan, and imported into Pakistan by a company named Business and Engineering Trends, situated at 24, Habibullah Road, Off Davis Road, Lahore. The 9mm pistols recovered from the terrorists bore the trademark and name of Diamond Nedi Frontier Arms Company, Peshawar. The unexploded hand grenades recovered from different places were found to be manufactured by an Austrian company named Arges which had given a franchisee to a Pakistani ordinance factory near Rawalpindi. Similar hand grenades had been recovered from terrorists involved in the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai and the attack on Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001.

The email sent to Indian media houses in the name of an organization called Deccan Mujahideen claiming responsibility for the attack was tracked to a proxy server in Russia. Investigation revealed that the account used to send the email belonged to Zarrar Shah, the communications chief of the LeT who was also in touch with the terrorists on the phone while they were holed up in the two hotels and in Chabad House. It was also revealed that Shah had organised a payment of US $ 238.78 to a New Jersey-based net telephony company named Callphonex to buy a VoIP connection. While buying the net telephony connection Shah used the fake name 'Kharak Singh' purportedly based in India. But the payment was sent by one Javed Iqbal who had a Pakistani passport numbered KC 092481. The connection thus purchased was used to make dozens of telephone calls to the terrorists while they were shedding innocent blood and unleashing the carnage in Mumbai.

The satellite phone used by the terrorists from the high seas was of Thuraya make. It was used to make calls to the LeT higher-ups while the ten terrorists were sailing towards Mumbai.

Over the weeks Maria interrogated Kasab many times. After the first few sessions Maria started speaking to Kasab in Punjabi. (Since Maria's forefathers were from Punjab, he speaks the language very well). One afternoon, about a month after the incident, Maria summoned Kasab in his office.

'Do you want to meet your other colleagues now?' he asked.

'Yes I would like to see them,' Kasab replied.

Maria called a crime branch officer inside his office and told him, 'Please take him to the place where his others friends have been kept. After their meeting bring him back to my office.'

Kasab was driven in a police vehicle to JJ Hospital. As Kasab entered the building he realised it was a hospital. 'Are they all badly injured?' he asked an accompanying police officer. The officer looked at him and said, 'You can see for yourself.'

Kasab was taken to the mortuary and the bodies of all the nine terrorists were slid out. Bodies of Javed and Shoaib were half charred. Nazeer's body was like a frozen mound of charcoal. Ismail's head had been severely damaged due to his bullet injury. Hafiz Arshad's face was almost completely burnt. Fahadullah had been shot through his eye. Nasir and Babar Imran's bodies were riddled with bullets. The faces of the terrorists were twisted, teeth jutting out, and the skin of the face was deathly pale or scalded and burnt. There was a sickening smell in the room. Kasab could not stay there for long. He told the officers he wanted to leave. He was driven back to Maria's office.

As Kasab entered the room Maria asked him, 'So, did you see the glow on their faces and smell the fragrance of roses emanating from their bodies as Hafiz Sayeed had told you?'

Kasab kept staring at the floor. Tears rolled down his face. Maria told a few constables to escort Kasab back into the crime branch lock-up.


Excerpted from 26/11 Mumbai Attacked, Edited by Harinder Baweja, Roli Books, 2009, with the publisher's kind permission.

Mumbai 26/11 - ( Part IV )






PART IV

How the terrorists landed

March 19, 2009


26/11 Mumbai Attacked, one of the first books on last winter's murderous acts of terror, explains the reality behind the attacks. It reiterates the chilling reality that India is under grave threat and the clock is ticking before the next big attack.

In the fourth of a five-part series, we bring to you an exclusive excerpt written by journalist Ashish Khetan on how the Coast Guard looked in vain for a Lashkar-e-Tayiba vessel in the days before the attack and the early days of the investigation into the attacks.
________________________________________

Terror's Trail

It was around 10.30 pm when the inspector general of Indian Coast Guard, Western region, Rajendra Singh -- in charge of the coastal security of 3,473 km of coastal belt along the western coast of India: a total area of 9,3,000 sq km of Arabian Sea extending from Koteshwar in Gujarat to Mattam Point in Kerala up to the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL, an imaginary boundary separating Indian waters from Pakistani waters) -- received a phone call from the Operations Room Centre of the Coast Guard in Mumbai. 'Sir, there appears to be a coordinated terror attack in Mumbai; the Taj hotel, the Oberoi hotel, the CST station and a place called Chabad House in Colaba have been attacked by armed terrorists.' Singh, who had just come back to his small room in Mayur Vihar, Delhi, from a routine departmental meeting at the Coast Guard Headquarters in the capital, was packing his bags to fly back the next morning to Mumbai -- the official base of the Western region.

Singh immediately turned on the television set. Hysterical anchors and reporters across different channels were giving sketchy, varying facts of the unfolding terror attack. 'More than twenty terrorists have stormed the city.' 'The Taj, the Oberoi and the CST have been attacked.' 'Few bomb explosions have occurred across Mumbai.' 'The terrorists are setting the Taj on fire.' 'Nine terrorists have been reportedly arrested by the police.' 'Terrorists had checked into the Taj and the Oberoi days in advance and had stored explosives in hotel rooms for the impending terror attack.' Singh, bewildered and shocked, remained glued to the TV as horrifying, fleeting images of burning hotel rooms and sounds of grenade explosions kept beaming on news channels.

Hundreds of miles away from the Mayur Vihar apartment in Delhi where Singh was staring at the TV, Bharat Dattatraya Tamore, fifty-eight, was sitting at a small, rickety desk in a badly lit, grimy police station at Cuffe Parade in Mumbai. Tamore had been staying at a fishermen colony -- a cluster of flat-roofed, matchbox styled houses in the squalor of an urban slum along the seashore -- at Cuffe Parade in South Mumbai since his birth. It was something that Tamore had seen that very evening at around 8.20 pm that necessitated his presence at the police station. Not far from the Taj President -- another five-star property of the Taj Group in Mumbai -- he had seen eight, maybe ten (it was dark and the occasion did not present a chance for a head count), strongly built, smartly dressed youth emerge out of the dark sea at the fishermen colony. The scene was odd enough for Tamore to register it; faces grimy and hair sticky from days without a bath, the youth made their way hurriedly with bulky rucksacks on their backs and additional bags in their hands.

'What else did you see?' asked Assistant Police Inspector Vilas Bhole, taking down notes on a white sheet of paper. 'They came in an inflated speedboat. Came right up to the shore, by the rocks and then got off the boat and walked towards the main road. They split up in groups of twos, each group went away separately, in different directions,' replied Tamore. Ironically, the men Tamore had seen were headed to wreak carnage at the Taj hotel, Tamore's workplace for the last thirty years, where he was employed as a steward. As Tamore sat narrating his eyewitness account to API Bhole, a few feet from him, his neighbour Bharat Kashinath Tandel, fifty-two, resident of kholi number 18 in the fishermen colony, was sitting across Sub-Inspector Anil Kamble.

Tandel had his own story to tell which was similar to Tamore's except for one additional, important detail. Tandel had sensed that they were not from Mumbai, their rubber speedboat was not like those used by the fishermen in the area, the anxiety on their faces making them all the more suspect. A curious and suspicious Tandel asked the men who they were and where they were headed. To this, one of them replied: 'Hum pehle se hi tang hain. Hume pareshaan mat karo. (We are already quite stressed. Don't pester us.)' Tandel and Tamore were alone at the time these men came to the shore. 'Normally, at that time of the evening, the place is buzzing with people. But this evening because of the day-night cricket match between India and England most of the men were inside their houses, watching the match on TV. If there were more people around we would definitely have had an altercation with them,' said Tandel.


Luck was on the terrorists' side

March 19, 2009


Not just the cricket match, it seemed that everything went the way of those ten men who came in the speedboat. That evening because of the high tide, seawater had come right up to the rocks, just 60-70 metres off the main road. Had it been low tide the water would have ended 150 to 200 metres away from the rocks, leaving in between a thick and slippery muddy stretch, one foot deep and difficult to manoeuvre. But the elements made everything a breeze and the strangers hauled their heavy bags off the boat and approached the road unhindered -- luck was on their side.

Tandel observed, 'The way they anchored their boat, the loop of the rope was different from the one tied by us fishermen.' Unfortunately, despite the peculiarities Tandel and Tamore had spotted, they did not inform the police. Both went back to their houses and like the others sat down to enjoy the cricket match. Only after news of the terrorist attack broke out on TV, did Tandel inform a police van patrolling the area. Police Inspector P N Jagtap, Sub-Inspector Anil Kamble and Sub-Inspector Rajendra Kamble, all attached to the Cuffe Parade police station, reached the spot.

With the help of the fishermen the cops retrieved the speedboat from the water, which had got unhinged and was drifting more than 200 feet away from the shore, and a bomb disposal squad soon arrived and rummaged the boat in search of explosives. Though no explosives or arms or ammunition were recovered from the boat, an assortment of seemingly harmless articles, which would soon form crucial material evidence, was recovered from the boat: eight yellow life jackets manufactured in China, an off-white drum of twenty-five litres capacity containing approximately twelve litres of diesel, some tools in a polythene bag, a yellow coloured tube of adhesive manufactured in Pakistan for fixing punctures, two eight-foot-long rowing sticks with a one-and-a-half-foot-wide patta. The boat had a Yamaha engine, and had been painted yellow, the colour recently applied -- as investigation would later reveal -- to make the boat look old. There were three valves on either side of the boat which the cops unscrewed to deflate it and then hauled it to the Cuffe Parade police station on a handcart.

The news of the recovery of an abandoned speedboat soon spread like fire. 'The terrorists had come by sea. An abandoned speedboat has been found drifting in the waters near Badhwar Park at Cuffe Parade': the bold words flitted across TV screens. In a flash, Singh's -- still glued to the TV -- status changed: from a horrified, concerned spectator he became a central character in the bloody terror attack. Exactly six days ago, on 20 November, at around 4 pm, Singh's office, situated in a three-storey complex at Worli sea face in Mumbai, had received a fax: 'Intelligence indicates suspected LeT vessel sighted in position 24 DEG 16 MIN North and 67 DEG 2 MIN East attempting to infiltrate through sea route. Request: 1) Direct ship in area to exchange surveillance. Launch Dorniers at first light for sea-air coordinated search; 2) Deploy ACV IB to patrol off-creek area.' The fax was sent by principal director (operations), Coast Guard Headquarters, Delhi, who in turn had received this particular intelligence from the IB.

Singh had immediately called up Deputy Inspector General T K S Chandra, the commander of Coast Guard District Headquarters of Gujarat, whose office is at Porbandar, and instructed him to launch a hunt for a suspicious Pakistani vessel which could make a bid to enter the Indian waters. DIG Chandra in turn alerted the three Coast Guard substations under his jurisdiction -- Jakhau, Vadinar and Okha, all in Gujarat -- and told them to launch their vessels into the waters along the IMBL and search for the suspected 'LeT vessel'. One interceptor boat each from Jakhau and Vadinar, two hovercrafts and one fast patrol vessel from Okha immediately sailed towards the IMBL.

At the time, two joint military exercises -- Defence of Gujarat (DGX 8) and Tatraksha XXIV being carried out by the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, Border Security Force (BSF), the Indian Army and the respective ports between 18 and 22 November -- were underway in which a total of six vessels of the Coast Guard were participating. After receiving the IB input Singh pulled out all the six vessels that were intended for the military exercise and moved them towards the IMBL. All in all, one offshore patrol vessel with an integrated helicopter (a vessel with a sustenance of twelve to fourteen days in the outer sea without any external help), one inshore patrol craft (sustenance of four to five days), two fast patrol crafts, one air cushion vehicle (hovercraft), two interceptor boats and two Dorniers were asked to patrol the Indian waters from Diu and head to Porbandar to Okha to Kandla to Jakhau across the IMBL. (The Western region of the Indian Coast Guard has a total of fourteen ships, eight Dornier aircraft, six helicopters, two advance light helicopters, ten interceptor boats and two hovercrafts to patrol the 9,73,000 sq km of Indian waters across the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and the Union territories of Daman and Diu and Lakshwadeep.)



The vain search for an 'LeT vessel'


March 19, 2009


But after two days of intense patrolling the Coast Guard failed to find any suspicious vessel, leave alone a Pakistani ship. On 22 November, Singh wrote back to its Delhi-based headquarters asking the principal director (operations) for a more specific, actionable intelligence like the colour or size of the vessel, the name or the kind of vessel, and if possible, some coordinates. The Coast Guard headquarters in turn wrote to the IB asking for specifics on the vessel. But the IB had nothing more to add to its first communique. On 23 November, the Coast Guard again wrote to the IB asking for 'specific, actionable intelligence', and the latter communicated back saying that if there was any more intelligence on the matter, the same would be conveyed to them.

The first, and in this matter also the last, location of the suspected LeT vessel -- as tracked and reported by the IB -- was 22 nautical miles (50 km) outside Karachi in the outer anchorage area which was way inside the Pakistani waters. The Indian Coast Guard can only intercept or board a vessel once it crosses the IMBL. However, from 21 to 26 November, boarding parties of Meera Behn (fast patrol vessel), Amrit Kaur (fast patrol vessel), Vijaya (offshore patrol vessel), and one inshore patrol craft boarded and inspected 276 Indian fishing vessels plying in the Indian waters. But all the 276 fishing boats which were boarded and checked by Coast Guard patrolling parties were clean; the sailors on board were bona fide Indian fishermen. At any given time there are 60,000 registered Indian fishing boats in the Arabian Sea, of which roughly 10,000 fishing boats are in the waters around the IMBL. The 276 Indian fishing boats searched between 21 and 26 November were all sailing close to the IMBL. On the night of 26 November, when the terrorists finally disembarked off a speedboat at Cuffe Parade in Mumbai, six Coast Guard vessels and two Dorniers were patrolling the Indian waters along the IMBL.

Through the night Singh made several calls to his commanding officers wanting to know how the terrorists had sneaked in by the sea (by now it was quite clear that the speedboat recovered from the fishermen colony belonged to the terrorists) and managed to give the Coast Guard patrolling vessels the slip. The terrorists could not have travelled by the speedboat in the high seas and must have definitely been dropped a few miles off the Mumbai coast by some bigger vessel. So, did the suspected LeT vessel the IB had first tipped them about sailed all the way to Mumbai and then lowered the terrorists in a small speedboat? Or did the terrorists sail to Mumbai in some merchant vessel and then got on to the dinghy? The Indian intelligence and investigating agencies were groping in the dark, looking for answers. And these baffling questions kept haunting Singh through the night. DG Coast Guard, Delhi, wanted to know if it was possible for any Pakistani vessel to enter the Indian waters despite the high alert. Singh on his part was assured that he and his team had not left any stone unturned since the IB alert, and for any Pakistani vessel to enter the Indian waters was simply not possible.

The next morning he took an Indian Airlines flight and landed in Mumbai at 9.45 am Singh drove straight to his Worli office; the roads were deserted and an otherwise one-and-a-half-hour journey from Santacruz airport to Worli was completed in twenty minutes. At around 12.30 pm the commanding station officer (operations) of Coast Guard at Worli received a call from the Western Command of the Navy asking him to intercept a merchant vessel called MV-Alpha which was headed towards Gujarat. The Indian Navy suspected that the terrorists had used this vessel to cross into Indian waters. Singh immediately alerted one of its vessels called Samar, which after three hours of hot pursuit intercepted the said merchant ship that had twelve Ukrainian crew members on board. After eight hours of rummaging, the Coast Guard cleared the ship of suspicion -- it was headed to Alang port for shipwrecking.



What the Coast Guard found on the Kuber

March 19, 2009


Then at around 2.10 pm, Singh received a phone call from the office of joint commissioner (crime) of Mumbai police, Rakesh Maria. Singh was informed that Kasab's -- the lone terrorist who was captured alive -- police interrogation had revealed that the terrorists had sailed to Mumbai in a brown-coloured Indian fishing boat with a wooden finish and it was abandoned 4-5 nautical miles off the Mumbai coast after which the terrorists got into a speedboat.

Maria who was still in the middle of interrogating Kasab told Singh that the terrorist had confessed to having killed the sailor on board and his body was lying in the engine room. Maria asked for the Coast Guard's help in tracking down the vessel. Singh called up the commanding officer of Coast Guard Air Squadron 842 at the Navy base Kunjali at Colaba and told him to immediately fly two helicopters over the coast of Mumbai and see if there was any suspicious Indian fishing boat drifting in the waters. Simultaneously, a Dornier which was doing a sortie close by was also told to look for this suspicious Indian fishing trawler going up north. Within twenty minutes Singh was informed by his officers aboard the two helicopters that they could see an Indian fishing trawler drifting 5 nautical miles south off Prongs Lighthouse, in the outer anchorage of Mumbai harbour. From the helicopter, no one was visible on the boat.

At 2.40 pm Singh called up Maria's office and told him about the discovery of a suspicious boat. Maria now asked Singh to ask his men to board the boat and see if there was a satellite phone and a GPS also lying in the boat. Two Coast Guard personnel were dropped from the helicopter on to the boat who on entering the engine room found a semi-decomposed body with hands tied at the back and throat slit from ear to ear. They also saw a dark black Thuraya satellite phone and a GPS with 'Garmin' and 'GPS 12 MAP' written on either side of the screen. At this time a Coast Guard ship called Sankalp, an advanced offshore vessel, was entering the Mumbai harbour after three days of sailing. Singh told Sankalp, with eighty-five Coast Guard personnel on board, to sail towards the abandoned boat. In the meantime, the two Coast Guard helicopters kept hovering over the boat, ensuring it did not drift out of their sight. By 6 pm a team of six sailors, headed by Deputy Commandant Vijay, boarded the boat and recovered a satellite phone and a GPS that were left behind by the terrorists. The deputy commandant retrieved four wave points that indicated the sea route taken by the vessel. The first wave point was 32 nautical miles into Pakistani waters from the IMBL, the second wave point was west of Porbandar, the third wave point was south-west of Diu and the fourth wave point was 10 miles west of Bombay harbour -- the point where the terrorists had abandoned the boat and lowered their speedboat.

The Coast Guard now had before them the exact route the terrorists had taken to sail to Mumbai. And it showed that they had got into the Indian fishing boat 32 nautical miles into Pakistani waters from IMBL. That is, the mother vessel carrying the terrorists never entered the Indian waters, giving the Coast Guard no chance to intercept them. Instead, the Indian fishing boat went deep inside Pakistani waters and was probably hijacked there. The Coast Guard found an assortment of items on the vessel: fifteen blankets; the same number of winter jackets and toothbrushes; two engine covers; a raft case on the trawler; a 'Sogo' spray paint; a few empty packets of fifty rounds of bullets for .34 bore gun with a 'Made in China' label; a nylon rope; an empty diesel plastic can of a petrol filling station with a head office address of HO No. 8, Industrial Area, Karachi; a white coloured packet of tissue papers branded 'Tissue The Senses' produced by Zik Brothers, Karachi; a 10 kg packet of wheat flour from a Karachi shop called Qamar Food Products, Plot No 3/3, Raita Plot, Shah Faisal Town; a packet of Pakistan-made pickle; a matchbox made in Pakistan; a floor cleaning brush; a two-litre Mountain Dew bottle; two detergent boxes branded PAK -- All Purpose Detergent, manufactured in Pakistan; a white 50 kg gunny bag with 'Pakistan White Refined Sugar, Crop Year: 2007-2008, Expiry Date: December 2009, Net Weight 50.00 KG' embossed on it; a tube of 'Touch Me' shaving cream manufactured in Pakistan; 'Medicam' dental gel made in Pakistan; eight razors of Gillette brand; eight pencil cell batteries of Duracell; black quarter pants labelled South-O-Pole, Made in Pakistan; two packets of Nestle milk with marking of Nestle Pakistan Limited; a few black and white namaz scarves with the label 'Cashmilan Best Qlty, Phone 0614516729'; a few packets of fairness cream; three handcuffs with steel chains and a metal plate with picture of a gun with instructions in Urdu.

These items, which would become a crucial part of the material evidence of Pakistan's involvement in the carnage, made it clear that all the ten terrorists had sailed from Pakistan with supplies of Pakistani origin. The papers onboard the boat showed that it was registered in the name of Kuber with the Gujarat fisheries department with the registration number PBR 2342. The maximum speed of Kuber, which had just one engine, was 8 nautical miles per hour. It requires special skills to ride a fishing trawler and with much difficulty the Coast Guard sailors, who are trained in driving hi-tech marine vessels, drove Kuber to Sassoon docks at Colaba -- it took them three hours to cover a distance of 5 nautical miles. At 9.30 pm on 27 November, the Indian Coast Guard handed over Kuber to the Mumbai police.


Excerpted from 26/11 Mumbai Attacked, Edited by Harinder Baweja, Roli Books, 2009, with the publisher's kind permission.

Thursday 19 March 2009

Mumbai 26/11 - ( Part III )





PART III


'Inflict maximum damage. Keep fighting and don't be taken alive'

March 18, 2009




26/11 Mumbai Attacked, one of the first books on last winter's murderous acts of terror, explains the reality behind the attacks. It reiterates the chilling reality that India is under grave threat and the clock is ticking before the next big attack.

In the third of a five-part series, we bring to you an exclusive excerpt written by journalist Ashish Khetan on how handlers in Pakistan directed the terrorists at the Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident hotels and Nariman House.

________________________________________
November 27. Time: 3.53 am, Oberoi Hotel

Handler 1: Brother Abdul. The media is comparing your action to 9/11. One senior police officer has been killed.

Terrorist 1: We are on the eighteenth or nineteenth floor. We have five hostages.

Handler 2: Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict maximum damage. Keep fighting and don't be taken alive.

Handler 1: Kill all hostages except the two Muslims. Keep your phone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire.

Terrorist 2: We have three foreigners including women from Singapore and China.

Handler 1: Kill them.


November 27, afternoon, Chabad House

Handler: Baat karao. [The handler in Pakistan instructs the Chabad House terrorist to put the hostage on line.]

Terrorist: Haan, bolein (Here, speak).

A woman hostage: Hello Who is that?

Handler: Did you spoke? Did you speak to the consulate?

Hostage: I am talking to the consulate they are doing they are making phone calls just now.

Handler: Already made it or you are going to make it?

Hostage: Yeah [She starts sobbing and then recovers to talk.] I've already talked to them. I was talking to the consulate just a few seconds back and they are making their phone calls. They have said to leave the line free so that they can get in touch with you anytime and tell you that we are pleased with you [again starts crying]. You understand?

Handler: Come again, come again. No I don't understand.

Hostage: They will get in touch with you anytime.

Handler: Don't worry, just sit back and relax and wait for them to make contact. Okay?

Hostage: [Cries]

Handler: Save your energy for good days. Maybe if they can contact right now maybe you will celebrate Shabbath with your family.

Hostage: [Cries again]

Handler: Give the phone back to the guy. [The terrorist takes the phone back from the hostage.] Handler: Iski baat hui hai. Abhi kissi bhi waqt phone aayega un logo ka. (She has talked to them. Anytime now their phone call will come.)

Terrorist: Mere number par? (On my number?)

Handler: Haan, aapke number par authorities phone karenge. Poochhenge, kya chahte ho aap log? To aapne sabse pehle yeh kehna hai ki yeh jo aasu gas ki shelling ho rahi hai, firing ho rahi hai, yeh silsila band ho. Matlab paanch minute ke andar Army ilaka khali kar de. Matlab yeh silsila agar chalta raha to hum log sabr, intezar nahi karenge. Aap likho in cheezo ko.

Achha, jo operation ho raha hai, Taj Mahal mein, Oberoi mein aur aapke oopar -- teen jagah -- in teeno jagah par operation fauran roka jaaye. Achha, doosra, inhone kaha hai hamara ek banda giraftaar kiya hai kal; unse yeh kehna hai ki banda fauran yahaan aapke paas lekar aayein. Aur khana-wana khaya? (Yes, on your number the authorities will call. They will ask, What do you people want? So, first you ask them to stop shelling tear gas and firing. That is, within five minutes the Army should leave. If this goes on, we will not be patient, we will not wait, You write these things down. And the operations they are carrying out in the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi and above you -- at three places -- should be stopped with immediate effect. And, another thing, they are saying they arrested one of our guys yesterday; tell them to hand him over immediately to you, here. And food -- did you have your meal?)

Terrorist: Thoda bahut (Little bit).

Handler: Thoda bahut? Yeh log to badi party-sharty karte hain, khana to hona chahiye. Achha yeh log halal hi khate hai, haraam nahi khate yeh log, to woh koi masla nahi hai (Little bit? These people hold lot of parties, there should be food around. These people eat halal meat, not haram [forbidden], so that is not an issue).


'This is only a trailer, the full film is yet to be shown'

March 18, 2009




November 27, 2.33 pm, Chabad House

Handler: Salaam ailekum?

Terrorist: Wailekum as-salaam.

Handler: Kya haal chaal hai? (How is it going?)

Terrorist: Allah ka shukar hai (Things are fine by Allah's grace).

Handler: Koi phone aaya? (Has any phone call come?)

Terrorist: Koi Inspector Patil tha Mumbai police ka; uska phone aaya. Maine kaha inspector winspector kya hota hai -- koi higher authorities se baat karao (It was some Inspector Patil from Mumbai police. I said I will not talk to some ordinary inspector -- get the higher authorities to talk).

Handler: Kaho area khali karao. Aur grenades feke bahar aapne? (Tell them to clear the area. And did you throw grenades?)

Terrorist: Haan ji feke (Yes, we did).

Handler: Kab feke? (When did you throw them?)

Terrorist: Abhi koi ek-do minute hua hoga (Just a minute or two back).

Handler: Koi halchal hui? (Did anything stir up?)

Terrorist: Grenade fekne ke baad koi jawabi firing nahi hui hai (There was no firing in response).

Handler: Kis taraf grenade feka hai? (In what direction did you throw them?)

Terrorist: Woh Merchant House ki taraf (Towards Merchant House).

Handler: Achha ab aap gun ki barrel bahar nikaal ke gali mein fire karein ek-do. Sirf barrel nikaalni hai, apna jism saamne nahi karna hai; neeche gali hai na open fire karein (Now you push out the gun barrel and fire once or twice in the lane outside. Don't expose your body, only the barrel; there is an open lane below -- fire there).

Terrorist: Haan open hai. Lekin hum daaye, baaye aur back mein fire kar sakte hain, front nazar nahi aa raha hai (Yes, it is open. We can fire in the left, right, and back, but we cannot see anything in the front lane).

Handler: Achha, to darwaza khula nahi abhi tak aapka? (Ok, so you have still not opened your door?)

Terrorist: Nahi abhi tak nahi khula (No, not yet).

Handler: Achha jo bhi bahar harkat karta hua banda nazar aaye na usko fire maaro. Apne aapko bachana hai; ek banda oopar chhat pe rakho, aur koi bhi movement nazar aaye to fire karo (The moment you see someone doing something outside, open fire. And, you have to protect yourself; put a man on the rooftop, and the instant you see any movement, open fire).

Terrorist: Achha yeh jo aurat hai agar iski hum khud media mein baat karaaye? Yeh khud media ko bataaye ki hamare saath yeh ho raha hai aur hamein bachaya jaye (Ok, what if we get this woman to talk to the media herself? She will tell the media what is happening with her and that she needs to be saved). [The instructor in Pakistan stops to watch TV for a while.]

Handler: Abhi aapne jo grenade feke hain usse media mein shor mach gaya hai (The grenade you just threw has created a commotion in the media). [A third person now takes the phone.]

Handler: Salaam ailekum.

Terrorist: Wailekum as-salaam.

Handler: Kaise ho bhaiya? (How are you brother?)

Terrorist: Allah ka shukar hai (Things are fine by the grace of Allah).

Handler: Jo baatein maine aapko batayi thi yaad hai na? Agar media waale poochhe kahan ke ho to kehna Hyderabad Deccan ka hoon; Hyderabad city ka hoon (You remember all that I had told you? If the media asks where you are from, tell them you are from Hyderabad in the Deccan; that you are from the city of Hyderabad).

Terrorist: Hyderabad.

Handler: Haan. Aur kehna Toli Chauki area ka hoon; aur kehna Mujahideen Deccan se mera talluk hai. Kis tanzeem se? Mujahideen Hyderabad Deccan. Aur woh pooche yeh sab kisliye kiya? Aap likh rahe hain na? (Yes. And say you are from the Toli Chauki area; say you are associated with the Deccan Mujahideen. And if they ask why you did all this? are you writing all this down?)

Terrorist: Haan ji (Yes).

Handler: Kehna hukumat ki dohri policy, hukumat to peeth thapthapati hai aur prashasan to sar par tole marti hai iski taza misaal Sachar Committee ki sifarshat hai, hukumat kuchh aur ailan karti hai aur prashasan uska amal Muslim naujawano ko pakad-pakad kar karti hai (Say it is the duplicitous policy of the government -- on one hand they pat our backs, on the other they beat our heads with hammers. The latest example of this is the Sachar Committee Report. The government declares one thing but the administration executes its reverse by wrongly arresting Muslim youth.) Terrorist: Muslim?

Handler: Yuvko ko... (Youth).

Terrorist: Yuv...

Handler: Muslim naujawano ko giraftar karta hai, unka jo future barbaad karta hai. Aur unko ultimatum de de ki yeh abhi hamara trailer hai, asal film to abhi baaki hai. Aur sun, itminaan ke saath baat karna, khali apni baat karni hai; unko sawaal karne ka mauka kam dena hai (Muslim youth are arrested, their future is ruined. And give them the ultimatum that this is only a trailer, the full film is yet to be shown. And listen, talk confidently, and only allow yourself to talk; don't let them ask too many questions). Terrorist: Theek hai. Inshallah (All right).




The terrorists make their demands

March 18, 2009



Handler: Ek minute (one minute). [The voice goes into consultation with other voices in the room. Some other voice now takes over the phone.]

Handler: Woh poochhenge aapki demand kya hai (They will ask what is your demand).

Terrorist: Ji (Yes).

Handler: Aap kehna, jitney bhi Musalmaan jailon mein band hai aap unko riha karo, number ek; number do, Muslim state Musalmaano ke hawale kar diya jaaye. Number teen, Kashmir se fauj bulayi jaaye aur Kashmiriyon ko unka haque diya jaaye. Babri Masjid par fauri taur par masjid ka kaam shuru kiya jaaye, uss jagah ko Musalmaano ke hawale kiya jaaye. Israel ke saath gathbandhan na kiya jaaye (You say, first, release all the Muslims in the jails; second, hand over the Muslim state to Muslims. Third, call back the Army from Kashmir and give Kashmiris their rightful due. Begin the construction of Babri Masjid immediately. The land of the masjid should be handed over to Muslims right away. Do not maintain ties with Israel).

Terrorist: Israel ke saath? (With Israel?)

Handler: Israel ke saath gathjod na kiya jaaye; aur Israel hukumat ko yeh ultimatum diya jaaye ki Musalmaano ke oopar zyadti band karein (Break off ties with Israel; and give the ultimatum to the Israeli government that it should stop the injustice on Muslims).

Terrorist: Musalmaano ke khoon se khelna band kiya jaaye (Stop playing with Muslim blood). [The terrorist gives his own poetic touch to the last bit while jotting down the notes.]

Handler: Aur Israel agar yeh nahi karega? Bas bas, yahi baatein theek hain, theek hai? (And if Israel doesn't agree? No, no, this much is enough, okay?)

Terrorist: Theek hai (Okay). [Another voice takes over the phone.]

Handler: Jo aapki jagah hai na, kehna Nariman House se baat kar raha hoon. Media kah rahi hai ki Nariman House mein aatankwadi hai (And the place you are at, say you are calling from Nariman House. The media is saying there are terrorists in Nariman House). [The terrorists and the planners knew the place as Chabad House, which is the commonly known name of Nariman House.]

Terrorist: Nariman House.

Handler: Nariman, Nariman. Aur saath saath khayal rakhna bahar ka bhi (And also keep track of what is happening outside).

Terrorist: Inshallah. Aur jo baate likhayi hain sirf utni hi karni hai? (And, what you have instructed, we have to say only that much?)

Handler: Utni hi; ek minute hold karein, number likhein. Yeh Zee TV office ka number hai -- 0120-2511064. Aur aapka number jisse aap call karenge bataoon aapko? (Yes, only that much; hold on one minute, write this number down. This is the Zee TV office number. And should I tell you the number from which you will call them, because they will ask you?)

Terrorist: Haan ji, bataien (Yes, tell me).

Handler: Aapka number hai 9819464530 (Your number is 9819464530).

Terrorist: 9819464530. Maine usko bolna hai mein bol raha hoon Nariman House se aur mujhe iss number par phone kare (I have to tell him I am calling from Nariman House and he should call me on this number).

Handler: Haan aap kahein aapke paas hostage hai, aur aap iss number par fauran call karein (Yes, you say you have a hostage, so call me on this number right now). [The phone call ends.]

Later in the evening, the terrorist, Babar Imran (Abu Aakasha) finally managed to get through a telephone number of India TV which was provided to him by his handlers.

In a fake Kashmiri accent, he first spoke to the receptionist and thinking he was on live television, he rattled off all the lines he had memorised. The receptionist was flabbergasted.

She asked Imran to be on the line as she transferred the call to the newsroom. The moment a male news producer said 'Hello', Imran again rattled off all the demands he had been told by his handlers to speak on TV.

The news producer told Imran that the conversation was not being broadcast live and asked him to pause so that they could talk normally.

After consultation with others present in the newsroom, the producer finally put Imran through to a female anchor.

Imran announced his demands to the world over the live telecast.

Throughout his conversation Imran maintained the fake Kashmiri accent he had assumed for the interview.

Soon after he ended his telephonic interview, the handlers in Pakistan called to congratulate him for the job well done.






'15 men have climbed down on your building'

March 18, 2009


28 November, 7.23 am, Chabad House

[The voice goes into consultation with other voices in the room. Some other voice now takes over the phone.]

Handler: Salaam ailekum.

Terrorist: Wailekum as-salaam.

Handler: Kya haal chaal hai pasha? (How are you doing pasha --[a term of endearment]?)

Terrorist: Mere khayal se team utaar di gayi hai (I think the team has got off).

Handler: Aapke chhat par pandrah bande abhi utre hain helicopter se (Fifteen men have climbed down on your rooftop right now).

Terrorist: Khidkiyon ke saamne bhi kuchh khade hain (They are standing in front of the windows as well).

Handler: Kya keh rahe hain? Aapko nazar aa raha hai kuch udhar? (What are you saying? Can you see anything there?)

Terrorist: Saamne kuchh firing ho rahi hai (They are firing in the front).

Handler: Aapke oopar se unhe neeche aana hai. Aapne seedhiyon par aisi position banani hai ki aate hi aap unhe gher lein: unhe seedhiyon se utarna hai neeche. Lekin aisi position banaye ki unke oopar aane se pehle aap grenade feke. Aap aisi position banaye ki matlab kamre mein rahein lekin jo seedhi hai na. Achha, aapko daaye baaye koi fauji nazar aa raha hai? (They have to climb down to reach you. Take such positions on the staircase so you can corner them as soon as they come: they will have to get down from the stairs. But you throw grenades before they come. You take such a position, you stay in the room but the stairs. Listen, can you see any Army personnel to your right and left?)

Terrorist: Hamare saamne saaf nazar aa rahe, khidkiyon mein baithe hain (We can see them clearly in the front, sitting in the windows).

Handler: Maaro, fire karo, burst maaro. Achha, baat suno, aap abhi kamre mein ho na, aap fire karo. Ek banda bahar darwaje ke paas position leke rakhe, ek andar se fire kare (Hit them, fire, open burst fire. Ok, listen, just fire from the room. Let one person take position by the door and you fire from inside).

Terrorist: Lekin hamara aage ka kamra damage ho gaya hai. Hamare paas position nahi baachti hai (But the room in front of us is damaged. We don't have a position left).

Handler: Lekin aapko woh nazar aa rahe hain. Kyunki jaise hi unhone aapko dekh liya unhone aap par fire shuru kar dena hai (But you can see them. Because if they see you, they too will start firing immediately).

Terrorist: To issi liye keh raha hun ki oopar chhat par jayein aur wahan ladayi kare (That's why I'm saying, we should go to the roof and fight there).

Handler: Aapne oopar nahi chadna hai. Do baatein yaad rakhni hain: number ek, jo sniper baithe huye hai na khidkiyon mein, jahan se mauka mil gaya wahan se inhe fire karna hai; doosra, jo log upar utre hai, pandrah log helicopter se, woh aapki taraf aa rahe hain. Unpar grenade feke (No, you do not have to climb up. Remember two things: one, as soon as you get the chance, fire at the snipers in the window; two, the fifteen people who have got off the helicopter are coming towards you. You have to throw grenades at them).

Terrorist: Hamare paas grenade sirf chaar bache hain (We have only four grenades left).

Handler: Achha, aap log apni positioning bana lein aur shuru ho jayein (Ok, you take your positions and begin).

Terrorist: Positioning mujhe samajh nahi aa rahi ki kaise banani hai (I cannot understand which positions to take).

Handler: Seedhiyan corner mein hai na pasha? (The stairs are in the corner, aren't they?)

Terrorist: Haan ji, ek side mein hain (Yes, they are on one side).

Handler: To ek banda seedhiyon ko cover kare aur doosra cross baithe; jaise maine shaam ko samjhaya tha. Jaise koi agar neeche aata hai to dono taraf se ghir jaaye. (So one of you has to cover the steps and the other has to sit across; the way I had explained it in the evening. So that if someone comes down, he is surrounded on both sides.)

Terrorist: Lekin woh agar grenade fekte hain to hamare paas grenade se bachne ke liye aad nahi hai. (But if he throws a grenade, we do not have any cover to protect ourselves.)

Handler: Meri baat suno pasha. Agar aap deewar se chipak kar khade ho jaate ho, aur agar grenade fekte to kya aap tak aa sakega? (Listen to me, pasha. If you stick to the wall, can the grenade reach you?)

Terrorist: Deewar maine bataya na (I told you about the wall).

Handler: Achha aapke paas aur kya hai -- koi sofa, furniture ya foam ka gadda? (Ok, what else do you have -- any sofa, furniture, or foam mattress?)

Terrorist: Haan, foam ka gadda hai, ek minute (Yes, there is a foam mattress, one minute). [Another man comes on the phone.]

Handler: Aap ek kaam karein. Aap grenade fekte hue neeche utarna shuru karein (You do this. While throwing grenades, you start climbing down).

Terrorist: Hamare paas grenade nahi hai (We don't have grenades).

Handler: Do to bache hai na? Woh istemal karein aur neeche wali manzil mein chale jaayein (You have at least two left, don't you? Use those and go to the floor below).

Terrorist: Hum darwaze ke peechhe chhup jaayein aur jaise hi woh andar aaye to hum firing karein? (Should we hide behind the door, and the moment they come, should we fire?)

Handler: Aap alag alag chhup sakte hain? (Can you hide at different places?)
[Another man takes the phone.]

Handler: Aap ek kaam karein. Aap chhat ki taraf chalein; grenade feke aur unki taraf fire karein. Woh aap par fire kare isse pehle aap unpar fire kare. Aap Bismillah karein (You do this. Go towards the roof, throw the grenade at them; and fire at them before they can fire at you. Do this now, in the name of Allah).

Terrorist: Theek hai, ja rahe hain Allah ka naam leke (Okay, we will go, remembering the name of Allah).

Handler: Bismillah-e-Rehman-e-rahim (In the name of Allah, most Gracious, most Compassionate).



The demonic voices who directed the bloody mayhem

March 18, 2009



28 November, 08.47 a.m.

Terrorist: Salaam ailekum.

Handler: Wailekum as-salaam.

Terrorist: Mujhe aag lag gayi hai. (I have got burnt.)

Handler: Kahaan lagi hai? (Where?)

Terrorist: Baju mein aur pair mein. (On the arms and on the legs.)

Handler: Allah-talla aapki hifazat kare. (May Allah protect you.)

Terrorist: Unke log bhi zakhmi ho rahe honge. (Their people also must be getting hurt.) [A loud gunshot rings in the background.]

Handler: Allah hafiz. (Allah protect you.) [The phone disconnects.]

The RAW later identified five Pakistani handlers who were giving instructions on the phone: Wassi, Zarrar, Jundal, Buzurg and Kahfa. Besides these five there was one more handler who was being called Major General by the terrorists.

Though the Indian investigative agencies know that Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Muzammil, Abu-al-Qama and Abu Kahfa were some of the conspirators of the Mumbai terror attack, they don't know much about most of the other handlers -- the demonic voices who directed the bloody mayhem -- and of their positions in the LeT and their background.

The Indian government has handed over parts of the intercepted conversations between the terrorists to the Pakistani government. After much procrastination and many wishy-washy statements, the Pakistani government, on January 15, 2009, finally announced the formation of a special team to investigate the Mumbai terror attack.

Foreign office spokesman, Mohammed Sadiq said that Pakistan has formed an enquiry team led by the Federal Investigation Agency that will conduct the probe into the matter.



Excerpted from 26/11 Mumbai Attacked, Edited by Harinder Baweja, Roli Books, 2009, with the publisher's kind permission.


Wednesday 18 March 2009

Ajmal - The Truth (Part II)




Part II

'Initially the attack was planned during Ramzan'
March 17, 2009

26/11 Mumbai Attacked, one of the first books on last winter's murderous acts of terror, explains the reality behind the attacks. It reiterates the chilling reality that India is under grave threat and the clock is ticking before the next big attack.

In the second of a five-part series, we bring to you an exclusive excerpt written by journalist Ashish Khetan on how the terrorists' handlers in Pakistan directed the terrorists at the Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Trident hotels and Nariman House.

________________________________________

At this point of time it was also important for the Mumbai police to question Kasab about the other terrorists who were part of one of the most daring terror attacks on Mumbai.

Kasab finally surrendered to the persistent questioning about the other eight terrorists and blurted out the details about them. The police already had details of Ismail Khan, who was with Kasab and was shot dead in the encounter.

'One is Abu Rehman. He is around twenty-five years. His eyes are brown. I think he is wearing a red shirt. Also "Yeshu" is written on his cap.'

'Yeshu?'

'Yeshu, yeshu.'

'You mean Christ?'

'Yes.'

'But you are all Muslims?'

'Yes. But you see, you have to look like them, to look like them he was wearing the cap.'

'Okay. Continue.'

'Abu Rehman is from Multan city. He had more Kalashan magazines on him than any of us. The second man is Abu Fahad. He must be around twenty-eight years. He is slightly taller than me.
He is from district Okara.'

'Tell me about the others.'

'Then there is Abu Rehman Bada (elder). He is also from Multan. Then Abu Ali from Okara district. Then Abu Soheb from Sialkot. And Abu Umer from Faisalabad.'

'What about the remaining two?'

'The other two are Abu Umar from Faisalabad and Abu Aakasha who is from Multan.'

'Where is your bag that you brought with you?'

'My bag is lying on the terrace of the Cama Hospital. I left it there.'

'What was there in your bag?'

'Kalashan.'

'AK-47?'

'Yes. One pistol. Two magazines for the pistol. Three double magazines of AK-47. Each magazine carries thirty bullets. So, in all 180 AK-47 bullets. The pistol magazine had seven bullets each. Eight hand grenades. Two hand grenades were of plastic cover. Three were big, of Arges make. Badaam, kishmish (almonds, raisins). Mineral water.'

'Badaam, kishmish, pista?'

'No, only badaam and kishmish, together weighing not more than half a kilogram.'

'How many hand grenades did you use?'

'Just two. The others fell out of my bag. Ismail must have used more grenades. He was leading. I was giving him cover. Ismail was in charge of this operation. He was the senior-most. Woh hamse pehle se jamaat me hai. (He was in the association before all of us.)'

'Where did you assemble the Kalashnikov?'

'No, it was already assembled. I just took it out of the bag and removed the safety pin.'

'Around what time did you reach Mumbai?'

'At around 8.15 pm we got off the dinghy and landed near a fishermen colony. We were told to launch the attack between seven and eleven in the evening. Zaki chacha had told us that if we somehow land in Mumbai late in the night, then to postpone it to the next day. And if we had landed early morning, then to start it by 11 am.'

'Where would you all have met after the operation?'
'Milne wale nahi they. Marne wale they. (We were not going to meet anywhere. We were supposed to die.)'

'Tell me about the ship you sailed in from Pakistan.'

'Arms and ammunition were already stored on the ship. We just boarded it on November 22 and after a few hours of sailing we got into the Indian launch.'

'Who owned the Pakistani ship?' 'Zaki chacha.' 'What was written on the ship?'

'Husseini, Al-Husseini. Then we got into an Indian launch. When we were only some distance off the Mumbai coast, at around 7 pm, we downed a speedboat, an inflatable one, and got into it and landed in Mumbai.'

'Who was driving the speedboat?'

'Ismail. You see, woh hamara amir tha (He was our leader). We first got off and hailed a taxi and came to CST. The others must have gotten off after us.'

'Where is the CD of the footage of the CST station?'

'It's in Lakhvi chacha's laptop.

Agar koi banda ho na jo unki field me ghus jaye to bahut maloomaat ikhatha kar sakta hai (If some guy infiltrates their group he can get a lot of information).'

'Can you take us there?'

'Yes, I can take you there, provided you give me enough security cover. Zaki can be beaten in his game by his own men.'

'Are you also linked up with Jaish-e-Mohammed?'

'No. Jaish-e-Mohammed doosri tanzeem hai (is another movement). We are Ahle-Hadis. Aur woh sala Deobandi hai (And those rascals are Deobandis).'

'What date was fixed for this attack?'

'Earlier we were told in Pakistan that we would do this during Ramzan. Then I don't know what happened. It was put off. We were not told the reasons. Then as I said we sailed out on November 22. But no date was fixed. We did not know how many days, four, five or seven, it would take in the waters before landing in Mumbai. But we were told to take care of the timing before we began the attack. If we had landed early morning then we were supposed to start the attack by eleven in the morning and if we arrived in the afternoon, or say evening, then between 7 and 11 pm.'

It is almost four in the morning. Ghadge has had enough of Kasab. He gestures towards the cameraman. The camera stops rolling. Kasab takes a deep breath and closes his eyes.

Excerpted from 26/11 Mumbai Attacked, Edited by Harinder Baweja, Roli Books, 2009, with the publisher's kind permission.


Intercepting the terrorists' conversations
March 17, 2009


Vijay Singh (name changed due to security reasons), thirty-eight, standing just under five-feet-eight with dense black hair, well-oiled and slicked to the side much like a schoolboy. Despite having a thick moustache, it is the youthfulness of his eyes that dominates his face.

He could be mistaken for a professional in the corporate world, a young IT professional perhaps -- which is in fact what he intended before he became an inspector with the Maharashtra police.

The last few years of his posting with the Mumbai ATS, though, had hardly given him an occasion to wear his khaki threads -- as a key member of the technical section of the ATS.

Although he did not have a degree in computer technology, with his technical bent of mind and aided by the formal training provided by the ATS, Singh had become an expert in cyber and electronic intelligence gathering. Singh loved his job: intercepting phone calls, hacking into email addresses or social networking profiles of computer-savvy terrorists, collecting cyber intelligence on terror modules.

However, lately things had been tough for him and for that matter all of ATS, particularly its chief Hemant Karkare. But this evening, the evening of 26 November, was different. After a long gloomy period, the smile had returned on Singh's face.

Tonight he wanted to celebrate, in his own inimitable style, by feasting on pav bhaji and milkshake at one of his favourite food joints behind the Byculla railway station.

He had just ordered one more masala pav and some faluda when his boss, Hemant Karkare called on his cellphone (Karkare spoke directly to all inspectors, assistant inspectors and sub-inspectors posted at the ATS).

'You call eating pav bhaji and faluda partying? Keep Friday evening free and I will show you what a real party is,' said Karkare bursting into laughter.

It had been a while since Singh had heard his chief this relaxed and cheerful. Singh was delighted that he had done his bit in bringing the smile back on Karkare's face.

The same afternoon a Mumbai court had granted the ATS three more days of police custody for Dayanand Pandey, prime accused in the Malegaon terror attack, the case that had led to the arrest of almost a dozen Hindu radicals accused of carrying out a bomb blast in Malegaon in rural Maharashtra.

The evidence produced by the ATS left the court with little choice than to extend Pandey's police custody. The ATS had shown the judge a video clip wherein Pandey and his accomplices could be seen plotting the terror attack.

The video clip was shot by Pandey using the webcam of his laptop (Pandey had this queer habit of recording meetings and telephonic conversations held with co-conspirators and storing them on his laptop).

It was Singh and his colleagues in the technical section who, after two weeks of rummaging through the data on Pandey's laptop, had retrieved the video clip.

The audio and video evidence was now expected to demolish the disparaging campaign kick-started by the Hindu right-wing parties, accusing the Mumbai ATS of being anti-Hindu and victimising saffron activists without any evidence.

The discovery of the video had changed everything: incontrovertible and clinching, it was going to steal the thunder of its detractors.

A few minutes after Singh spoke to Karkare he got a phone call from his friend informing him about the firing at the Oberoi hotel. His pav bhaji half-eaten, Singh rushed towards the Oberoi.

As he parked his car on the road opposite the hotel he saw smoke billowing out of the upper lobby of the Oberoi; then a few foreigners, screaming and pleading for help, came running out of the hotel.

A few minutes later there was an ear-splitting explosion. Another blast followed -- lesser in decibel volume -- perhaps that of a grenade, but loud enough to send people scurrying for cover. Singh decided to call up Karkare but the latter disconnected the call.

A few minutes later Additional CP Parambir Singh of the ATS called Singh and asked him to rush to the ATS office and get cracking with other staff members at the technical room. The time was 10.50 pm.

In less than fifteen minutes Singh walked into the technical room of the ATS, equipped with modern gadgets, high-end computers and advanced technology for intercepting phone calls and electronic communication.

Assisted by three more inspectors and half-a-dozen police constables, all technically trained, Singh started coordinating with different cellphone service providers, scanning their international gateways for any suspicious calls, concentrating on the calls originating or ending in the localities surrounding the Taj hotel, the Oberoi hotel and Colaba.

But there were thousands and thousands of telephone calls passing through the international gateway and also the cellphone towers in the area around Colaba and Nariman Point.

The ATS staff sucked out a few conversations from the air -- whispery voices speaking Arabic or some other Middle Eastern language -- but soon they were found to be of tourists or businessmen, all above suspicion.

More calls were taken on 'listening' but they too turned out to be clean. Soon doubts started creeping into Singh's mind. Maybe the terrorists were not using telephones.

Maybe they were not communicating at all. But the technical staff of the ATS had to stay on the job. ATS chief Hemant Karkare and the second-most senior officer, Parambir Singh, were both out in the field, in the middle of operations.

A small TV set kept in a corner was telecasting the unfolding carnage live. Pictures of blood, bodies, burning hotel rooms, fire, smoke, injured people were being aired in rapid succession.


'Set the bedsheets and carpets on fire'
March 17, 2009

At around midnight the news flashed that Hemant Karkare along with a few other senior police officials had been seriously injured in an exchange of fire with the terrorists near Cama Hospital.

A few seconds later the news flashed that Karkare had been shifted to JJ Hospital and his condition was critical. Singh felt his blood freezing. For Singh and the other inspectors Karkare was more than just a boss; he was their mentor, a father figure, the patriarch of the ATS family.

An eye on the breaking news section of the TV screen, Singh and his colleagues kept toiling for the next one hour, without much luck. Dozens of calls were put under observation but none had anything suspicious.

Then at about 1 am the ATS received a phone call from the IB. The IB had managed to find three cellphone numbers that were being used by the terrorists at the time. The agency passed on these numbers to the ATS which in turn immediately put them under observation. After the first breakthrough there was no looking back for the ATS technical staff.

They found out that these three numbers were receiving phone calls from the number 00-120-1253-1824 which turned out to be a virtual number allotted by an international VoIP provider, in short, known as net telephony.

Thereafter, all the calls made by this number to India or received from India were put on interception. Soon the virtual number flashed on the screen of Singh's computer. It was making a call on an Indian cell number whose then current location was the Taj hotel. The time was 1.05 am.

Terrorist: Hello.

Handler: Salaam ailekum.

Terrorist: Wailekum as-salaam.

Handler: Yaar, tumhara kamra 360 ya 361 number jo hai woh pata lag gaya in logon ko, kya camera laga hai? (Your room, 360 or 361, they have come to know about it. Is there a camera?)

[The conversation continues as recorded in the Taj Operation section, till the handler asks them to put the bed-sheets, etc, on fire.]

Terrorist: Lekin baaki kamre na band hain; hamare paas ek hi kamra hai. Agar idhar aag laga di to kidhar jaayenge? (But the other rooms are closed; we have only one room. If we set this on fire, where will we go?)

Handler: Achha aur kamre nahi khul rahe hain. (Oh, so the other rooms are not opening.)

Terrorist: Na ji. (No sir.)

Handler: To na gali mein ja ke kaalin mein aag laga do. Aag lagane ke kaam mein der nahi karni hai. (Then go and put the carpets in the corridor on fire. We cannot delay setting the place on fire.)

Terrorist: Inshallah. (Allah willing.)

Handler: Aur jab mein phone karoon to attend karna. (And attend the phone when I call.)

[The call disconnects.]

It was the first call between the terrorists and their managers that the technical staff had intercepted. The handler was keen to be in control of the situation. It was now clear to Singh that though the carnage, the mayhem was being carried out in Mumbai, the director, the puppeteer, the invisible hand was in some safe haven, monitoring the TV, and planning the next move, like a football coach or an army general.

The conspiracy had been orchestrated to the last detail. The Indian intelligence and investigative agencies had their own version of 9/11 to contend with.

The terrorists holed up in the Taj, the Oberoi and the Chabad House soon stopped using their own phones (the Indian SIM cards which they had brought with them) and started using the cellphones of their hostages. But as they kept switching over to different cell numbers, the ATS too kept trailing these calls, putting the new numbers under surveillance.

'ATS chief Hemant Karkare shaheed'
March 17, 2009

The phone number 00-120-1253-1824 again flashes on Singh's computer screen. A cellphone in the Taj hotel rings.

Terrorist: Salaam ailekum.

Handler: Wailekum as-salaam. Aag lag rahi hai ki nahi? (Is the fire on yet?)

Terrorist: Bas kapde ikatthe kar rahe hain. (We are just collecting the cloth.)

Handler: Jaldi laga do. Aur launch ka kya kiya tha? (Light it quickly. And what did you do with the launch?)

Terrorist: Bas aise hi chhod di thi (We had just left it like that).

Handler: Kyun? Woh valve nahi kholi thi pani bharne waaste? (Why? Did you not open that valve to let the water in?)

Terrorist: Nahi, woh kholi nahi jaldi jaldi mein, kaam kharab ho gaya tha. (No, we couldn't do it in a hurry, some things went wrong.)

Handler: Kya kaam kharab ho gaya tha? (What had gone wrong?)

Terrorist: Woh jis jagah utarna tha na wahan mauje bahut zabardast lag rahi thi aur udhar ek kashti bhi aa gayi thi. Saare bole navy hai, navy hai, to jaldi jaldi doosri boat mein utre; samaan utara. Ismailbhai ka satellite bhi wahin rah gaya. (A powerful tide had risen where we were to get off and another boat had also come there. Everyone said it's the Indian Navy, so we quickly got onto another boat with the baggage. Brother Ismail's satellite phone also got left there.) [The call ends.]

The Cuffe Parade police station had taken a speedboat into possession that was found drifting near the fishermen colony at Badhwar Park a little earlier that night. It was not the large motorboat the terrorists were referring to.

Singh immediately passed on this piece of information -- the fact that the terrorists had come by sea and had abandoned a launch on the high sea, though on the phone the Taj terrorist did not mention where they had abandoned it nor did he specify what kind of a launch it was -- to senior officers. Singh and his colleagues tried to intercept as many calls made by terrorists as they could, recording all the conversations as they would soon form critical evidence.

At around 1.20 am the news broke on TV: 'ATS chief Hemant Karkare shaheed.' For a few moments it seemed time had stopped. A stunned silence enveloped the room. Frozen to their seats, they all kept staring at the TV. Singh in a late reaction picked up the phone and called up Karkare's driver. 'Saab khatam ho gaya hai,' said the driver, confirming the news. A glacial rush flowed through his veins. He was hoping Karkare's injuries were not serious. Hoping he would survive. But no. It was over. Tears started rolling down his eyes. For Singh and his colleagues in the ATS, the death of Karkare signalled the end of an era. Karkare, who was being maligned by Hindu radical organisations, and accused of appeasing Indian Muslims, was killed by a bunch of Islamist terrorists sent allegedly from across the border. When alive, Karkare had often said that terror had no religion. His death exemplified his credo.

Seconds after Singh had put the phone down, the number 00-120-1253-1824 again blipped on his computer screen. Singh picked up the headphones, though his mind was numb, his eyes bleary, his senses stunned; despair and defeat writ large on his face. The time was 1.25 am.

After exchanging some details about starting the fire in the hotel with bed-sheets and mattresses, the handler informed the terrorists about the scenario in Mumbai.

Handler: Mahaul bahut achha bana hai. Poore shahar mein tabahi machi hai. Dhai sau se zyada log zakhmi hue hain. Terah-chaudhah jagah firing ho rahi hai, to pareshan mat hona. Allah aapke saath hai. Achha ek commissioner bhi maara gaya hai, media kah rahi hai. Achha sun, ATS ka chief bhi maara gaya hai. (A conducive environment has been created. The whole city is under destruction. More than 250 people have been injured. There is firing in thirteen-fourteen places, so don't worry. Allah is with you. One commissioner has been killed, the media is reporting. And listen, the ATS chief has also been killed.)

Terrorist: Achha. Lo, Umer aur Ali aa gaye hain. (Ok, Umer and Ali have returned).

[Another handler comes on the line and inside the Taj hotel the terrorist called Umer takes over the phone.]

Handler 2: Umer, salaam ailekum.

Umer: Wailekum as-salaam.

Handler 2: Achha, ghabrane wali koi baat nahi hai. Allah ke fazal se jo Bombay mein operation karne wala chief hai na, woh mara gaya hai; abhi thodi der pehle. (Ok, there is no need to panic. By Allah's grace, the chief who ran operations in Bombay has been killed, just a little while back.)

Umer: Kaun maara gaya hai? (Who has been killed?)

Handler 2: Chief maara gaya hai Bombay ka; commissioner mara gaya Bombay ka. Bahut saare log zakhmi hain, mar rahe hai. Poore shahar mein firing ho rahi hai, aag lagi hui hai. Allah ne aapse bahut achha kaam liya hai. (The chief of Bombay and a commissioner have been killed.
Many people are injured, many are dying. Firing is on throughout the city; there is fire at many places. Allah has extracted very good work from you).


'There are ministers in the hotel, find them'
March 17, 2009

The call ended at 1.47 a.m. As Singh listened to the call, the terrorists shared the news of Hemant Karkare's death. For them, the death of the ATS chief, who they knew as someone who ran operations against terrorists, was a big victory.

At around 2 am a deputy director of the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing), Subodh Jaiswal joined the ATS technical staff. Together, they put to use all their technical know-how to intercept the communication between the terrorists.

The terrorists were speaking in Punjabi Urdu. The Mumbai ATS only had one officer, Parambir Singh, who knew the language well. But he was camping at the Oberoi, coordinating the police action there.

Jaiswal's arrival at the ATS office gave the technical staff the much-needed moral boost. Until a few months back Jaiswal was serving as an additional commissioner in the Mumbai ATS and knew all of them well.

Being from Punjab, Jaiswal was also well versed with the language and was able to catch the idiom the terrorists were using. For the next two days, along with the ATS staff, Jaiswal intercepted and recorded over six-and-a-half hours of telephonic conversation between the terrorists and their handlers.

Hundreds of miles away from the Byculla based headquarters of the Mumbai ATS, the operations room of the IB situated in a sprawling complex at Sardar Patel Marg in Delhi was buzzing with activity.

Parallel to the interceptions being made by the Mumbai ATS, the IB was doing its own interceptions. The three Indian cell numbers which the terrorists had first used after landing in Mumbai were already under the IB's watch. Ironically, these numbers had been provided to the LeT activists by undercover security personnel who had managed to infiltrate the ranks of the LeT in India.

The LeT operatives in India had sent these numbers to their masters in Pakistan. The Indian intelligence agencies believed that since these numbers were under observation they would know in advance what the terrorists were up to. But the ten terrorists switched on these numbers only after landing at Badhwar Park a little after 8.15 pm. By then it was too late.

Time: 2.48 am, Taj Mahal Hotel

Terrorist: Salaam ailekum.

Handler: Wailekum as-salaam. Achha tumhare hotel mein wazir hai teen -- kisi kamre mein teen wazir hain aur ek cabinet secretary hai. Jo saari cabinet ka secretary nahi hota, woh bhi hain tumhare hotel mein. (Listen, there are three ministers in your hotel -- in some room -- and one cabinet secretary).

Terrorist: Oye, oye, oye! Badi khush-khabri sunai hai (Oh, that's great news!)

Handler: Yeh teen-chaar bande dhoond lo, fir jo marzi manwa lo India se. (Find out these three-four men, then you can make India agree to anything).

Terrorist: Inshallah, bas dua karo Allah se. (Allah willing, just pray to Allah.)

Handler: Aur grenade feko. Bahar shayad navy aa gayi hai. Khidki se fire karo aur grenade feko. (Throw grenades. Probably there is Indian Navy outside. Fire and throw grenades from the window.)

[The phone call ends.]